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L'impartition des services informatiques, même si elle peut entrainer de
nombreux bénéfices, implique un risque. Comme tout type d'investissement, ce
risque doit être évalué et géré. Cet article propose un cadre d'analyse pour le risque
d'impartition des services informatiques, et évalue ce cadre à l'aide d'une étude de
cas. Ce cas présente deux décisions d'impartition de services informatiques, dans
le domaine de l'assurance. Le niveau de risque de chaque décision est évalué et les
mécanismes permettant de gérer ce risque sont présentés. Les résultats montrent
que, en détaillant les facteurs de risque et les événenents correspondants, il est
possible de cibler les éléments les plus risqués et de réduire le risque à un niveau
acceptable.
While it can bring several benefits, IT outsourcing entails some risks. As
it is the case in other types of investments or business ventures, the risk associated
to an IT outsourcing project must be evaluated and managed. This paper proposes
a framework for the management of IT outsourcing risk, and assesses the
usefulness of the framework using data gathered about two cases of system
development outsourcing. After providing a conceptual definition of risk and of risk
exposure, the paper presents the proposed risk management framework. The two
cases are then described along with the evaluation of the level of risk exposure of
each, and the risk management mechanisms that were included in the contracts.
The results of the study suggest that by charting the various items that contribute
to risk exposure, and by specifically applying the appropriate mechanisms that can
target the elements with the higher levels of risk exposure, outsourcing risk can be
adequately managed.
Mots Clés : Sous-traitance des systèmes informatiques, gestion du risque des
systèmes informatiques, théorie de l'agance, économie des coûts
de transaction, étude de cas
Keywords : Outsourcing of IS, IS risk management, agency theory,
transaction cost economics, case study
JEL : L23
11.  Introduction
"You'll never have all the information you need to make a decision – if you did,
it would be a foregone conclusion, not a decision" [22, p.156].
Risk is inherent to almost any business decision. New product development,
capital investments, and implementation of state of the art technology are
often used as examples of risky business ventures; while they may lead to
major benefits, they may also result in important losses. Outsourcing decisions,
and contractual arrangements of the type required by an IT outsourcing deal,
are another example of a risky business endeavor. While it can lead to lower
costs, economies of scale, access to specialized resources, and new business
ventures [15,16], outsourcing can have unwanted outcomes such as escalating
costs, diminishing service levels, and loss of expertise, to name a few [11,13,17].
This is not to say that outsourcing is bad in itself. It only means that, as in
other risky business ventures, risk assessment and risk management are
important contributors to the success of an IT outsourcing venture [27]. This
paper proposes a framework for the management of IT outsourcing risk, and
assesses the usefulness of the framework in the particular context of two
systems development outsourcing contracts.
The paper first defines the concept of risk exposure which is a function of two
variables, the probability of undesirable outcomes and the potential loss
related to the occurrence of the outcomes. The risk management framework is
then presented, and its relevance is assessed by analyzing two systems
development outsourcing contracts.
2.  Risk exposure of IT outsourcing
Following Boehm [8], risk is defined here as "the possibility of loss or
injury", that is, the probability of occurrence of undesirable outcomes. Boehm
also introduces the concept of risk exposure which takes into account the
importance of the loss due to the occurrence of undesirable outcomes. Risk
exposure is then defined as follows :
RE = P(UO) * L(UO)
2where RE is the risk exposure, P(UO) the probability of an undesirable
outcome, and L(UO) the loss due to the undesirable outcome [8, 21,31].
Figure 1 illustrates the concept of risk exposure. Consider the following
undesirable outcome which is sometimes associated with IT outsourcing :
service debasement. There exist four possible scenarios for this outcome. In
the first scenario (low RE), the characteristics of the outsourcing contract are
such that there exists a small probability that it will result in poor service
quality. Moreover, in this example, it is estimated that no serious loss is
related to poor service quality. Consequently, the level of risk exposure of the
project (with respect to this undesirable outcome) is low. In the second
scenario (high RE), both the probability of service debasement and the loss
related with poor service quality are high. In such a case, there is a high level
of risk exposure. The other two scenarios will result in medium levels of risk
exposure. In one case, the probability of service debasement is high while the
potential loss related to it is low. In the other instance, there exists only a
small probability of service debasement, yet the loss related to this outcome is
high.
Figure 1: Risk exposure
The loss due to a given undesirable outcome can be approximated either via
quantitative analysis (for instance, by evaluating the amount of sales lost due
to disruption of service to customers) or via qualitative assessment (for
instance, by using Likert scales) [5, 28].
In certain circumstances, the probability of occurrence of an undesirable
outcome can be estimated on the basis of the past performance of the object
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3under study [20]. However, in several areas such an assessment is difficult, if
not impossible, to perform [5]. Consequently, several risk assessment
methods adopt the approach of approximating the probability of an
undesirable outcome by identifying and assessing the characteristics of a
situation that are likely to influence the occurrence of the outcome [2,5,7].
These characteristics are labeled risk factors.
This approach was adopted by Aubert, Patry and Rivard [3] who reviewed the
IS and the industrial organization literature, and identified the most often cited
undesirable outcomes of IT outsourcing, as well as the main risk factors
related to each. Table 1 summarizes their findings.
Table 1: Components of risk exposure of IT outsourcing
Undesirable outcomes Risk factors leading to
undesirable outcomes
Unexpected transition and
management costs [9,11,24]
• Lack of experience and expertise of
the client with the activity [11,18]
• Lack of experience with outsourcing
[11]
Lock-in [25] • Asset specificity [14,33]
• Small number bargaining [23]
Costly contractual amendments
[11]
• Uncertainty [1,6]
• Technological discontinuity [18]
Disputes and litigation [4,17] • Measurement problems [1, 6]
• Lack of experience and expertise of
the client and/or of the supplier with
outsourcing contracts [11, 18]
Service debasement [4,17] • Interdependence of activities [3,19]
• Performance ambiguity [11,12]
• Lack of experience and expertise of
the supplier with the activity [11]
• Supplier size [11]
• Supplier financial stability [11]
Cost escalation [17,18] • Opportunism of the supplier [12, 29]
• Lack of experience and expertise of
the client with contract management
[11, 18]
Loss of organizational
competencies [10,11,17,30]
• Proximity of the core competencies
[26]
43.  A Risk Management Framework
The objective of risk management is to reduce the level of risk exposure of a
given business venture. Given an expected level of benefits from an
outsourcing strategy, a rational, profit maximizing, and risk-averse decision
maker wishes to minimize the risk exposure of the project or the strategy. A
boundedly rational decision maker may wish, for the same given level of
benefits, to bring the level of risk exposure below some threshold or
acceptable level (this is a “satisficing” decision rule, in Herbert Simon’s
terminology ). In both cases, reduction of the level of risk exposure can be
achieved in two ways: either by reducing the losses associated with the
undesirable outcomes, or by lowering the expected probability of occurrence
of such outcomes.
This is shown in Figure 1. Examination of this figure also suggests that in
order to be effective, a risk management strategy has to focus on the
appropriate component of risk exposure. For instance, in a scenario where the
probability of an undesirable outcome is low but the loss due to the outcome
is high (upper left quadrant), a risk management approach which would be
aimed at reducing the –already low– probability of the outcome would not be
very effective, or could be prohibitively costly. Accordingly, the risk
management framework illustrated in Figure 2 proposes four generic risk
management strategies.
Strategy I is appropriate for a medium level of risk exposure, and focuses on
reducing the importance of the loss related to the occurrence of an undesirable
outcome.
Assume that reducing the probability of occurrence of a given outcome incurs
costs. Further assume that the marginal cost of reducing that probability is
increasing. This means that any reduction of the probability of an occurrence
below some level entails exponentially rising costs. It is therefore never
desirable to drive that probability to zero. In fact, casual empiricism leads one
to argue that this is plainly impossible.
As a result, for an outcome with a very low probability, reduction in risk
exposure is most economically pursued through a strategy aimed at bringing
the consequences of the outcome within reasonable bounds. Strategy I is the
Tolerance Strategy: the decision maker prepares himself to cope with the
(unlikely) occurrence of an undesirable outcome.
Buying insurance is the archtypical example of this strategy. Many deflection
mechanisms, which essentially transfer to third parties the costs of coping
with undesirable consequences, fall into that category. Incentive contracts,
5wherein the amount due to the outsourcer will depend on the quality of the
service rendered, are an example. Bonds and warrants play a similar role.
Some contingency planning strategies also help in bringing down the level of
losses. The outsourcer who maintains an idle or underutilized capacity to
perform certain tasks in order to be ready in case of a contract failure or
disruption bears a (rather small) recurrent cost in exchange or a reduction in
the level of losses.
Strategy II is the mirror image of Strategy I: it refers to all measures aimed at
reducing the probability of an undesirable outcome. In situations where losses
are not very large, but the probability of occurrence is relatively high, it
appears economical to reduce this probability.
An example will illustrate how this can be achieved. Consider a case where
the potential loss associated with service debasement is moderate, but the
probability of its occurrence is high, corresponding to the lower right quadrant
of Figure 1. Suppose that, as suggested by the risk management framework,
the probability of service debasement was estimated by assessing each of the
risk factors associated to this outcome (see Table 1), and were found as
follows : (1) a high degree of interdependence between the outsourced
activities and those kept in-house; (2) the potential supplier lacks experience
and expertise with the activities to be outsourced; (3) the potential supplier is
a small firm, and (4) is not financially stable.
In this case, applying Strategy II would mean to carefully choose the activities
to be outsourced in order to reduce the degree of interdependency, and to
select a financially stable supplier, with sufficient resources to provide a good
level of services, and with an appropriate level of experience and expertise
with the activities to be outsourced.
This will be feasible when the behavior of the partners, that of the outsourcer
and of the supplier, impinge in predictable ways on the probability of
occurrence. This is the very reason why insuring against such losses is
difficult: the insurer faces the classical situation of moral hazard. By fully
insuring the outsourcer, the insurer diminishes the incentive to behave in a
prudent fashion.
Strategy II could be termed the Strategy of Prudence: the outsourcer actively
tries to manipulate the probability that the undesirable outcome will occur,
mainly through its own behavior, and by properly inducing and enticing an
appropriate response from the supplier, through incentive contracts, for
instance.
6Strategy III definitely corresponds to a risky outsourcing strategy. The
rational outsourcer will persist only if he or she envisages large payoffs, for
the risk exposure is high. Once the decision to go ahead has been taken, the
outsourcer tries to deal with both high probabilities of a negative outcome and
important losses. Thus, in addition to actions taken to lessen the probability of
occurrence of an outcome, the outsourcer will seek to increase his or her
tolerance. Hence, this is our Mixed Strategy.
Strategy III naturally involves a mix of deflection, mitigation and contingency
planning moves. Deflection calls for some form of insurance : through an
explicit contract, or implicitly through the reputation of the supplier.
Mitigation implies that the outsourcer will try to actively reduce the likelihood
of an undesirable outcome. Contingency planning implies, while the
probability and the impact of the undesirable outcome may remain
unchanged, the search for alternative courses of action that may be taken if
the occasion arises [28]. Parallel sourcing is an example of such an alternative
course of action.
Finally, Strategy IV is mainly a Monitoring Strategy. It is well suited to
situations in which both the probability of occurrence and the losses are
deemed relatively small. Any effort to reduce either the probability of an
outcome or its impact would only be marginally profitable. This calls for two
things: first, it is important to periodically reassess the level of risk exposure
in order to determine if it has remained the same; and secondly, the outsourcer
should make sure that all the “standard safeguards” are well in place. The
situation does not warrant, however, that important resources be devoted to
the design of sophisticated instruments or contracts to deal with the situation.
Figure 2: A Risk Management Framework
Probability of undesirable outcome
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7The following section illustrates how one outsourcer dealt with risk exposure
in two major outsourcing projects.
4.  Methodology
A case study was conducted as a preliminary test for the usefulness and the
adequacy of the proposed framework. The study was conducted in a large
insurance company which sells individual as well as group insurance
products. The company employs 3500 people; its operation centers are located
in four cities, in two different countries. The company currently uses over 200
information systems to support its business needs.
For the purposes of the study, two system development outsourcing decisions
and the resulting contracts were analyzed : the Year 2000 project and the
Application development partnership project. For each outsourcing decision,
data were collected from the following sources : requests for proposals,
supplier proposals, contracts and addenda, and interviews with managers who
had been involved in the decision process and managers in charge of
overseeing the contracts.
Using this data, the level of risk exposure of each outsourcing project was
estimated. To do so, the importance of the potential loss due to the occurrence
of each undesirable outcome listed in Table 1 was first evaluated, on a 1 (very
low) –7 (very high) Likert scale. Then, the probability of occurrence of this
outcome was approximated – on a 1-7 Likert scale - by assessing the
importance of each of the risk factors associated with the outcome (see Table
1). As shown in Figure 3, this resulted in seven data points for each
outsourcing project (one for each undesirable outcome). The following
section presents the essential elements of this assessment of risk exposure.
5.  An Exercise in the Evaluation of Risk Exposure
Contract 1 – Year 2000
As it is the case in numerous firms, a large proportion of the systems used by
the insurance company do not support the four digits required to handle the
year 2000 date format. The firm estimated that the year 2000 would have
major impacts on 36 of its systems and minor impacts on 29 others. Twenty
four additional systems would soon be replaced by new versions that would
support the four-digit year and 46 others remained to be evaluated. The
estimated effort required for migrating all the systems through the millenium
was more than 25000 person-days. The insurance company did not have the
8skills, the expertise, nor the human resources available in-house to undertake
this endeavor. It was decided to rely on an external provider to perform the
Y2000 conversion.
In this case, the potential loss associated to transition and management
costs was estimated as being rather low. The negotiation process mobilized
several executives who prepared the request for proposals and evaluated the
suppliers’ propositions. The company evaluated that the equivalent of one
hundred person-days were spent on those activities. In addition, legal fees
(minor) were paid to a law firm for writing the contract. Since the entire
project was estimated to require 25000 person-days, the anticipated transition
costs represent approximately 0.4% of the overall project cost. The ongoing
management costs were also expected to be minimal. The outsourced
activiteies are self-contained and clearly identified. A committee would meet
periodically to ensure that the schedule is respected. The main risk factor that
can lead to unexpected transition and management costs is the lack of
experience and expertise of the client with the activity. In this case, the client
has extensive experience in software development. It is a large organization
that develops software on an ongoing basis. Therefore the potential loss and
the probability of such a loss were rated very low (1-1) – see Figure 3.
The potential loss associated with lock-in is substantial. If the supplier were
to renegotiate the contract, threatening the client to renege on its promise to
deliver the Y2000 modifications on time, a lock-in situation would be created.
Such a threat, if credible, could force the client to accept paying a major
premium to ensure that the modifications are delivered on time. The Y2000
imposes a strict deadline for project completion. However, this loss is limited
because the contract is not renewable. The supplier would not be able to keep
the client locked-in for a long time since this contract, by its essence, will end
within two years from the signature date. The potential loss was evaluated as
medium-high (4). The probability of such a loss is rather low. Many suppliers
can perform this contract. Six proposals were received before the current
supplier was selected, and the Y2000 modifications are not very specific in
nature. The required technical knowledge is common to many suppliers.
Therefore, the probability of the negative outcome was rated as very low (1).
The third potential loss evaluated is the occurrence of costly contractual
amendments. In this case, the potential amendments were minor (2). The
work is very well defined (upgrading the system for Y2000) and potential
changes would be minor ones. The probability of having such changes is very
low (1). The systems requiring modifications are carefully examined by the
vendor and the client before the signature of the contract and therefore there is
9little uncertainty regarding the work required. The systems are not replaced,
they are modified. There is no technological discontinuity involved.
Any dispute or litigation is costly. Since this type of software modification is
rather well-structured, it would ease the litigation process by facilitating the
demonstration of a party’s argument. The costs of litigation were estimated as
medium-low (3). Litigation is often due to a lack of clear and agreed-upon
measures to evaluate the activities, and to a lack of experience with
outsourcing from the parties. In this case, measures exist and are agreed upon.
Moreover, both parties (client and vendor) have extensive experience with
outsourcing of IS activities. Therefore, the probability of litigation is very low
(1).
In this project, of the most feared outcome is service debasement. In this
case, poor service quality would be costly (5). A deterioration of the level of
service would threaten the ability of the insurance company to keep a steady
course through year 2000. Poor service would impede many day-to-day
operations and generate numerous errors that would be costly to correct.
However, the probability of such an event is very low (1): the supplier chosen
is a large and established firm, competent and experimented with this type of
activity. Moreover, the Y2000 activities are very independent from the other
activities. Finally, service will not be affected while the outsourcer performs
its tasks.
A frequently mentioned outcome of IT outsourcing is cost escalation. The
importance of the potential loss associated with this outcome was evaluated as
medium (4). Effort could naturally be overestimated. This increased cost is
however limited because the contract itself is limited in time (until year 2000).
Therefore, were the supplier be tempted to inflate its prices, it could only do
so for two years. The probability that such an escalation occurs is moderate
(4). Prices are subject to supply and demand and, in the past year, there has
been a significant increase in demand for Y2000 expertise. This leads to price
increases and could drag up the costs of the services. The opportunism of the
supplier has more leeway to manifest itself. But this possibility is moderated
by the experience of the client with outsourcing and with vendors, helping the
client in overseeing the supplier’s work and preventing cost inflation.
Finally, the last undesirable consequence is the loss of organizational
competencies. In this case, it is very low (1). The client did not have specific
Y2000 competencies in the beginning. And the skills involved are not a
highly valued expertise in the organization. The skills that are potentially lost
are not precious. The probability of loosing valued skills is also very low (1)
since Y2000 skills are far from the core competencies of the organization.
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Contract 2 – Application development partnership
The second project is called the Application development partnership project.
The insurance company was dealing with approximately 65 different software
development firms, even it had a large internal staff developing information
systems. It was decided to stop awarding contracts to so many different
suppliers and to select one (or maybe a few) application partner that would
invest time and resources in understanding the company and its needs. It was
believed that doing so would enable the firm to receive the same benefits (ex.
market price, access to outside expertise) as in the current situation (with
numerous vendors) while enjoying a more personalized and more dedicated
service from a partner expecting to develop many projects for its client.
Dedicated partners were presumed to assume more responsibility and to
shoulder more risks for their client.
The unexpected transition and management costs of this outsourcing
arrangement are minimal (1). Negotiation time was evaluated at
approximately 110 person-days, to which the legal fees limited to contract
verification and authentication were added. This represents a very minor
percentage of the contract overall value: execution of the contract involves a
minimum of 10 000 person-days per year. The probability associated with this
potential loss is also very low (1). As mentioned previously, the client is
experienced with regards to software development, enabling it to foresee
transition and management costs.
The potential lock-in of the client with a vendor would be costly (6). If such a
situation arose, the client would be trapped is a situation where it would be
attached to a particular supplier. Because it is a large organization that
undertakes many software development projects yearly, such a situation
would permit the vendor to extract a quasi rent from the client over a long
period. But the probabilities that such a situation occurs are low (2). Although
the projects involve some specific knowledge, linked to the firm’s unique
activities, many suppliers could perform this work. After the request for
proposals, twenty-nine suppliers submitted offers. Even if there was some
disparity among the quality of the offers, the number indicates that many
suppliers can provide those services. Of course, once a supplier is chosen and
has begun providing the service, this supplier gains a better knowledge of the
company, which gives him a competitive advantage over potential supliers.
Costly contractual amendments are the most important threat in this case.
Changes in specifications, technology and efforts required from the vendor
are very likely. The insurance business is information intensive and
modifications in the technology infrastructure are common and often
11
significant. Therefore, a strict contract would require major modifications
when new technology is introduced, or when competitors use an existing one
in new ways to gain competitive advantage. Those actions are very difficult to
foresee and preclude the use of complete contracting. The potential loss
associated with such modifications is high (6). Also, the probability of such
modifications is significant. It was valued at (3) for the following reasons. In
the short term, the development agenda is fairly well defined, presenting low
uncertainty and subject to no major changes in the technology used. In the
longer term, the uncertainty is much higher and the probability of
technological discontinuity increases significantly. Therefore, the overall
probability is medium-low.
The potential loss associated with dispute and litigation, like in the first
contract, was evaluated as medium-low (3) for the same reasons. However,
the probability of such event is slightly higher in this case (2). The measures
available for this contract are less well-defined and the work itself is less self-
contained. Performance ambiguity represents a greater problem here. This is
tampered by the expertise of the parties. The suppliers having made the offers
were experienced, as was the client.
The potential loss due to service debasement was estimated as medium-low
(3). If the software developed was not up to the client’s expectations, service
would be affected gradually. The systems in place are up to date and running
properly. The systems developed will be put into production as they are
completed. A lower quality system would marginally affect the overall
service. In the longer term, as more and more systems of lower quality are
used, it would increasingly affect the company. The probability of such
negative event is low (2). The activities concerned by the outsourcing contract
are interdependent. The systems developed affect the other information
systems. They also interact and affect activities of the firm. However, the
suppliers considered are large, financially stable, and have extensive
experience with software development activities. They have a lot to lose by
providing low quality service.
Increased cost of service (cost escalation) was estimated to be medium-low
(3) in this case. The costs of the systems developed can be subject to
escalation. It is limited by the type of agreement sought by the client. The
client wants a general agreement establishing the rules for pricing and
management of the projects as they are approved. Therefore, it defines some
upper limits for cost escalation. The probability of such cost escalation is
medium-high (3). As in the first case, the opportunism of the supplier can
manifest itself. Moral hazard and imperfect commitment are to fear. Again,
12
the experience of the client with outsourcing and with the use of vendors
helps reduce this probability.
Finally, the importance of the potential which would be due to the loss of
organizational competencies is low (2). According to the managers who
were interviewed in the study, expertise with software development is
important in this organization, but it is not essential. The firm retain in-house
skills related to overall planning of information systems resources. The more
specialized (technical) skills are available on the market. The probability of
loosing these competencies is medium (3). Indeed, many IS employees,
discouraged by the perspective of seeing all the interesting projects given to
external vendors decided to leave the firm. Some loss of skills is already
apparent. Yet, these skills are not among the core competencies of the
organization; therefore, their loss does not increase the probability of
undesirable consequences for the firm.
A brief examination of Figure 3 indicates that some aspects of each project
have higher levels of risk exposure than others. The next section briefly
presents some of the measures the insurance company included in the
contracts to lower the level of risk exposure of each project.
Figure 3 : Risk Level
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6.  Contract and Risk Management
Strategic contracting deals with risk management by either reducing the
probability of occurrence of an undesirable outcome, or by cutting the losses
of such an outcome. Crafting, designing, negotiating and implementing a
contract that will minimize the risk exposure of the client for a given level of
benefits is an art. Efficient contracts structure the relationship between the
client and the supplier in ways that are beneficial to both.
There is no exhaustive or explicit list of risk management measures and
mechanisms. But, our examination of the two outsourcing contracts reveals
that the client has purposively tried to manage the risk involved in
outsourcing. We comment on several features of the contracts and show why
these features should be expected to reduce the level of risk exposure to, one
can only presume, reasonable levels.
The incidence of contracting on the level of risk exposure of each project, and
for each undesirable outcome, can be seen on Figure 4, where the arrows
indicate to what extent the measures adopted by the insurance company
contributed to reduce the level of risk exposure.
Contract 1 - Year 2000
The Year 2000 contract involved three distinct possible undesirable outcomes
with relatively high potential losses. These were : lock-in, service
debasement, and increased costs of services. Examination of the contract
reveals that each outcome was dealt with specifically. In each case, contract
design is expected to reduce the probability of occurrence.
Consider first the lock-in problem. Lock-in is here limited to a few years since
the project will end in year 2000 at the latest : the supplier cannot extract rents
from the client beyond that point in time. Yet, the latter took several steps to
protect himself against any rent-seeking from its supplier.
To check his dependence vis-à-vis the outsourcer, the client ensured that some
of his own employees participated in each stage or the project. This assured
the client that there was some retention of knowledge that would facilitate the
transfer to another supplier in the advent of contractual difficulties.
Also, payments to the supplier were made conditional on approval of the work
by the client. Since Y2000 compliance is either complete or not for each
system, and since this can be ascertained and tested rather easily, tying
payment to performance reduces the scope for opportunistic behavior on the
part of the supplier.
14
Protection against lock-in is finally achieved through sequential contracting.
By splitting the work to be done in many sequential steps, each corresponding
to a system to be modified, with its own specifications and pricing, the client
achieves two ends: he ties the duration of the contract to verifiable
performance on the one hand and he leaves open the possibility of walking
out of the relationship if things were to take a bad turn. Since the contract
does not contain any exclusive clause, the supplier’s scope for opportunistic
behavior is efficiently reduced by sequential contracting.
Lock-in represented a rather low probability, but high potential losses.
Contracting clearly increased the tolerance of the client to that risk by
reducing the stakes: the client managed an exit that would cut his losses.
In the case of service debasement, the main mechanism used by the client to
reduce the probability of occurrence of this outcome was the inclusion of an
important penalty for underperformance. This penalty is equal to five times
the total value of the contract (which is a multi-million dollar contract). This
serves two purposes: it elicits greater effort from the supplier, thus reducing
the probability of occurrence of the undesirable outcome; and it serves as a
type of insurance, thus reducing the monetary value of the consequences of
the undesirable outcome.
Finally, in view of cost escalation, the client also sought to reduce the
magnitude of losses. For instance, all proposals from the suppliers had to
provide guaranteed rates. As mentioned before, each system is included in its
own addendum. For each system, a preliminary analysis was conducted and
an evaluation of the effort required was provided by the supplier. This
evaluation represented an effort at capping prices. A 20% error margin was
tolerated, which means that the final price could not be inflated by more than
20% from this first evaluation. Then, if the client agreed on the first
evaluation, a detailed evaluation was done. A 10% error margin was then
fixed on this detailed evaluation. The parties agreed ex ante on the evaluation
method and relied on a detailed inventory of the various components,
languages, platforms, size, complexity, testing environments, interactions
with other systems, etc. Finally, to measure the quality of the work done, the
client had a discretionary right of audit
Those contractual measures enabled the client to reduce the risk exposure of
cost escalation significantly. And this was mainly achieved by capping the
losses, thus by increasing the tolerance of the client to the inherent risks of
outsourcing. The probability of such a loss was also reduced, mainly by the
use of an addendum for each piece of the project.
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As shown by the arrows drawn in Figure 4, the potential losses associated
with lock-in, service debasement and cost escalation are reduced, moving the
coordinates of those outcomes down along the Potential Loss axis.
Contract 2 – Application Development Partnership
In the second contract, the risk exposure stemming from lock-in was reduced
in two ways. The first one is multiple sourcing: the client uses of more than
one supplier. As mentioned earlier, 29 suppliers made offers to the client.
Three were selected to work concurrently.
Multiple sourcing makes room for competition between suppliers and
provides an interesting yardstick for the assessment of individual
performance. The sole presence of three suppliers actively involved in the
operations seriously curtails the probability of being locked-in for the client.
The contract also includes specific measures that define the situations in
which the client could prematurely terminate the agreement with one of the
suppliers. These include the rendering of inadequate services, and the
negligence of respecting any term of an agreement.
Similarly to the Y2000 contract, systems to be developed are consigned in
addenda. This permits the client to include very specific quality measures for
each system developed and to limit its commitment to any of the three
suppliers to the system defined in the addendum.
Potential losses from lock-in are thus severely constrained, and the probability
of being faced with rent-seeking behavior is also diminished. As indicated in
Figure 4, this results in a repositioning of the lock-in outcome to the South-
West, reducing the risk exposure of the client.
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Figure 4: Risk Management
Renegotiation problems and costly contractual amendments are also handled
through this separation of the assignments in addenda. Since these addenda
are only written and added to the contracts when the systems (or parts of
systems) are required, they are written at various times during the
relationships with the suppliers. This enables the partners to actually modify
their contract without costly renegotiations. It is an ongoing modification
process that is included in the contract. It also allows the client to stop giving
new assignments to a supplier who is perceived as inflating its costs or
delivering poor quality services.
The outsourcers know this: they are thus more efficiently motivated and the
probability of an undesirable outcome is decreased as well as the overall
losses. Hence, the two outcomes with the highest risk exposure in contract 2
are dealt with in the contracting strategy with both Prudence and Tolerance
strategies.
7.  Conclusion
The two cases studied provide some support for the proposed risk
management framework. First, it was possible, from the detailed data obtained
about each case, to assess the level of risk exposure of each IT oustsourcing
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decision. Second, the risk management approaches adopted by the insurance
company can be explained, and their appropriateness can be determined,
using the framework.
More precisely, it was found that lock-in and service debasement in Contract
1 and lock-in and contractual amendments in Contract 2 were outcomes with
high levels of risk exposure. Contracting strategies of the Tolerance and
Prudence types were implemented to cope with these. On the other hand,
many undesirable outcomes – such as unexpected transition costs, costly
disputes and the loss of organizational competencies – only had low levels of
risk exposure. They were plainly “acknowledged” and dealt with by the client
only through surveillance and the inclusion in the contracts of standard
features, such as the definition of an arbitration process. This could be
assimilated to the proposed Monitoring Strategy.
Further empirical analysis is definitely warranted. First, our measure of risk
exposure needs to be operationalized and validated. Second, a larger sample
of outsourcing projects is required so as to lead to stronger conclusions.
Finally, an examination of activities that were kept in-house would also shed
light on the consistency of our framework. Would the level of risk exposure
of these activities fall into the upper right quadrant? Intuition and the
framework suggest that organizations refrain from outsourcing those activities
associated with a prohibitive (non economical) benefit to risk exposure ratio.
This suggests that some portion of the upper right quadrant is uneconomical
for outsourcing, the risk exposure being much too high.
While the two cases examined do not constitute a thorough verification of the
proposed framework, they nevertheless illustrate its fruitfulness, and provide
enough empirical support to motivate further research.
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